El artículo discute el contexto de la creación del nuevo Museum of the History of Polish Jews que abrirá sus puertas en Varsovia, Polonia, en el año 2010.
The museum is the brainchild of a group ofhistorians connected with Warsaw's Jewish Historical Institute. lt is a State/private partnership -a novel development in Poland-between the Polish state which had provided the first $20 million in funding (the museum is expected to cost at least $100 mi Ilion), and the Association which runs the Institute and is responsible both for the project and for fundraising for it worldwide. An intemational committee, under the conjoint aegis of the Presidents of Poland, Israel and Germany, supervises the project. The City of Warsaw has allocated, free of charge, the plot of land on which the museum will be built. It will stand in the heart ofwhat was the city's Jewish district, tumed into a ghetto during the war by the Nazis. Completely razed after the Uprising of 1943, this part of the city was rebuilt after the war in a drab, Stalinist style. A huge plaza in its center surround's Nathan Rappaport's monument to the heroes of the Uprising, unveiled in 1948. The museum will stand at the other end of this plaza.
The museum will be much more than just an institution of education and research. It has, in faet, the potentíal to beeome an important factor shaping the way Poland understands its past, and thus also builds its present and faces its future. In order to understand that, ít is neeessary to tum to that past, and elosely examine sorne of its aspects.
Throughout its en tire post-war history, Poland has struggled with the memory of its Jewish past. The issue ofhaving witnessed the most devastating genocide in human history, eornmitted by the Germans on Polish soil, and in front ofmillions ofPolish witnesses, would have by itself been hard enough to deal with; human soeieties do not witness genoeides and then eontinue with business as usual. The memory remains, in the stories told and untold, and in the nightmares. Though this burden alone would have been hard to bear, it became eompounded by the fact that many Poles had partieipated in the genocide, or profited from it. The horror was therefore unavoidably informed by guilt -but also by legitimate pride: Poles make up the single largest group ofYad Vashem 's Righteous Among the Nations.
Yet, alongside the heroic attempts of dozens of thousands of saviors, there was al so a seeret and shameful glee among many for finally having been freed of the "Jewish question" whieh, in the pre-war years, had come to be seen by a majority of Polish society, thanks to the relentless propaganda ofnatÍonalists and Catholic fundamentalists, as the most important issue the eountry faced. This glee was more widespread even than the guilt, making any discussion ofwhat aetuaBy had happened almost impossible. How to speak of the genocide and not deplore it? Yet -how to deplore the genocide while secretly being glad for its end result?
All this would have made any meaningful discussion of Polish Jewish history, not only of the war-time years, but of the nine eenturies of Jewish Jife which had preceded them, next to impossible. Franee, for instance, whieh had faeed similar problems of memory as Poland did, alleviated, ít is true, by the faet that the Jewish death to11 was less by orders of magnitude, but eompounded by the faet that not only many individual Frenehmen, but the French State itself, had participated in the erime, struggled to come lo terms with it for half a century. Yet France had a double advantage on Poland in that respect: not only it had emerged from the war badly wounded only, and not broken, but, even more importantly, it emerged from it a free country. Poland, on the other hand, had lost almost 6 million dead (more than half of them Jewish), or 16% of its population, to Franee 's 560 thousand, or 1,35% and emerged from Nazi terror to fall victim to Soviet occupation. The war that had started over Poland's independence ended with tbe country losing it again. The Polish Communist regime the Soviets bad set up was bloody, brutal and hostile to free discussion. The country was far too traumatized to be able to engage in much intellectual introspection anyway -but, wben it tried to nonetheless, it found itself muzzled by the Communist censor.
Communism not only sti fled debate, but twisted and perverted itas well-and few topics became as twisted and perverted as the Jewish past. Before the war, the Communists had been a small but outspoken adversary of tbe then pervasive anti-Semitism and, in their post-war onslaught on Poland's rigbts as well as its wrongs, repeatedly condemned all ofthe country's pre-war political regimes as "Fascist anti-Semites". The reality had, however, be en somewbat more differentiated and less condemnable, and this made the Polish anti-Communist majority feel that Poland itself was being branded that way by its new masters, and branded unfairly. To compound this quandary, Polish Communists of Jewish origin were quite prominent amongst these new masters, something that was almost impossible before the war. Apart from members of Parliament from the different Jewish parties, always in the opposition, not only there had not been before almost no Jews among the nation's political elite, but even a Jewish provincial stationmaster would have been an oddity. Thus, and for similar reasons, an average Pole in tbe late Forties looked at the ethnic mix of Poland's new political elite somewhat like a white Alabamian from the same period would have looked at the present racial mix of that State's politicalleadership -a Jewish minister just as unpleasantly surprising as a Black govemor. But the Communists, isolated and lacking legitimacy, went simultaneously to great lengths to conceal, or gloss over, the fact that Jews were prominent in their leadership, as they knew tbis made them even less legitimate in the eyes of a majority of Poles. This in tum had lead to an instrumental ban on the discussion of all things Jewish, apart from cases which suited the leadership politically. And finally, quite a few ofthe non-Jewish Communists, especially from among the opportunists who had flocked to the party in power, were themselves anti-Semitic, a fact which would reveal itself with a vengeance in the "anti-Zionist" campaign of 1968.
Finally, the small -and, due to emigration, shrinking still more-community of Jewish survivors lived in the early post-war years essentially in separation from Polish society at large. This was due to wartime trauma, the very real fear of post-war anti-Semitic murder (at least several hundred, possibly several thousand Jews were killed in the Forties) -and to the fact that, in contradistinction to that society, the Jews had largely, and publicly, thrown their lot in with the new regime. Tbis was hardly surprising: not only tbe regime was the only force which could provide sorne security against anti-Semitic murderers, but it openly declared, and implemented, a policy of non-discrimination. Those Jews who, for political, social, national or re1igious reasons could not countenance living under Communism, or remaining in Poland for whatever reason, left, initially legal1y, then illegally. Those wbo remained were, in tbeir majority, at least reconciled with the new regime, while jt was rejected by a majority oftheir ethnically Polish co-citizens. For all those reasons, Jews did not participate, as Jews, in such post-war Polish debate on Jewish issues as there was. With the passing of time, the remaining Jews, who already were overwhelmingly assimilated, as opposed to what had obtained before the war (the non-assimilated Jews had been immediately recognizable, and for that reason had little chance to survive the Germans and their collaborators), saw themselves as Poles, acted as Poles, and gradually, their Jewish identity smedded, became entirely Polonized-not only in their own eyes, but also in the eyes of society at large. This meant, however, that no specificalIy Jewish voices could be heard any more, even if such an express ion would have been allowed, and therefore there could not be a counterweight to distorted ideas. The Poles were left to debate myth against myth -among themselves.
In a nutshelI: since the war, the Poles were, for complicated reasons involving guilt, shame and fear, uneasy in discussing things Jewish. These were, furthermore, not their main concem: the country, devastated by the war, was undergoing a second trauma due to the brutal nature of Soviet occupation and the Communist regime it had imposed. This regime, in tum, stifled and perverted what debate there was, while its own attitude towards Jews was intemally contradictory. Furthermore, Jewish voices, again for separate complicated reasons, were all but absent from that debate. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that things Jewish simply disappeared from public awareness; the topic became taboo. The "anti-Zionist" campaign of 1968 vociferously, if briefly, changed that state of affairs -obviously for the worse, perverting even further what already had been twisted. From the second half of the Seventies onwards, however, a new generation bom after the war became more and more interested in things Jewish, and brought them again to public attention, this development concomitant with, and furthered by, the rebirth ofthe democratic opposition which produced Solidarity and eventually brought about, in 1989, the end ofCommunism. But by then the damage had already been done.
Apart from a brief mention here and the~e, the history of Polish Jewry disappeared from school and university textbooks of Polish history, from guidebooks to formerly ofien significantly or predominantly Jewish town, and from public awareness. The Communists reveled in what they considered one oftheir main successes -the new ethnic unity ofPoland-and for once nobody challenged them. Not only the Jewish origins of many a Cornrnunist politician became unrnentionable; the same became true of the biographies of outstanding figures of Polísh sciences, art and letters, including sorne ofthe country's most beloved poets, though they themselves might have been intensely Jewish. What remained of Jewish monuments, orphaned afier the murder of those who had lived or prayed there, graduaIly decayed. Cemeteries became dumps or construction sites, synagogues were converted into storage facilities, sports clubs or, at best, library or museum buildings. The history ofthe war was rewritten, its Jewish victims becoming anonymous "Polish citizens", the Shoah merely a footnote to the-only too real-"suffering ofthe Polish nation at the hands of the Hitlerites". The Auschwitz site was officially named "Museum of the martyrology of the Polish nation and other nations"; in the list of the latter, Jews were mentioned last, the Polish word for Jew conveniently beginning with the last letter of the Polish alphabet. The only remaining visible sign of nine centuries ofhistory -Nathan Rappaport's towering monument to the heroes of the ghetto uprising in Warsaw-stood on the central square of a new housing development which had grown around it, out of the ruins of the ghetto. lt became almost impossible to understand why it had been built in the first place.
And yet it is obviously impossible to understand not only the monument, not only Warsaw, but the history ofPoland itself -without the Jews. From the first mentions ofthe country by early mediaeval Jewish cmoniclers and the first coins ever minted there by Jewish minters, through the grandiose history of the golden age of the Polish Commonwealth, with its Va 'ad Arba Artzot, the (Jewish) Council ofthe Four Lands (ofPoland), the only Jewish executive polítical body that existed between the destruction of the Second Temple and the creation of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, through the glory of the Baal Shem Tov and of the Vilna Gaon, through the bravery of Jewish militants, such as Berek Joselewicz or Feliks Perl, fighting for their country's independence during the long era of the Poland's partition, to the poetry of Julian Tuwim, the prose of lsaak Bashevis Singer and the music of Arthur Rubinstein -the Jews have been an integral part of Poland. Not as tolerated guests, or secondary actors, but as co-shapers of the country, by far not only victims, but proud builders. Even in the increasingly anti-Semitic climate of inter-war Poland, this fact had been impossible to deny-but its awareness has been lost in the horror of the Shoah and the trauma of the Communist period which had followed.
Since Poland had recovered ¡ts independence in 1989, as a democratic country, part ofEurope again and a friend of the US and of Israel, much had been done to change this sorry state of affairs. Literany hundreds of books of Jewish interest had been published, the Jewish Culture Festival in Cracow has become the continent's largest, and hundreds ofPolish scholars, writers, joumalists and community activists have produced an impressive array ofworks, from scientific monographs through joumalistic debates to local commemorations of the memory of neighbors lost. Public debates about the crimes of the past -honest now, and daring attract widespread attention and passion.
In just one case -the debate around Jan T. Gross ground-breaking book "Neighbors", describing the wholesale wartime massacre of Jews by their Polish neighbors in the town of Jedwabne a stunning 85% declared in a poll to be following i1. The renascent Jewish community, through its recovered synagogues, schools and organizations, and events addressed to society at large, is very much part of this vibrant cultural scene. Though anti-Semitism, as evidenced throughout that period, is shamefully far from dead, there is among the Poles today a growing thirst for knowledge about their country's Jewish past, without which they cannot fully understand nor their country, nor themselves. Yet it will take years ofhard work to undo the legacy ofthe past and resources are scant and few.
To be sure, the average Polish citizen today can partially satisfY this thirst through reading novels, participating in events, vísiting restored siles. Yet Jewish contents filters but slowly to the history textbooks his children use, the local museum will at best have a case or two of the precious few Jewish artifacts which have survived the 20 th century, and his best chance to see a Jew is when he watches movies. For all the genuine interest, things Jewish are still sidelined not by hostility this time, but simply by the absence of things to show, and places to show them. This legacy of the Nazi and Communist past, detrimental to Poles and Jews alike, cannot be allowed to stand.
The Museum ofthe History ofPolish Jews intends to change this. Once opened, on the plaza on which Rappaport's monument, no longer incongruous then, stands, it will attract hundreds of thousands of visitors each year. It will compensate for the shortage of artifacts by stunning visuals and video displays. It will make up for the silence and distortions of the past by exhibitions and public debates, in which the memory ofthe glory ofPolish Jewry will be brought back to life. Though this is, and rightly so, a Polish, not a Jewish institution: Poland has a legitimate interest in reclaiming its Jewish heritage, the Museum will, by closely cooperating with the Jewish community, ensure that Jewish history will no longer be marginaJized, but retumed to its legitimate place ofpride. Ofpride for Poles and Jews alike.
Museums are obviously about the past -but this one is also about the present and the future. It will bring back to Jews and Poles that what they have been robbed of: the memory of a common past, of triumphs shared and disasters experienced together. Nor will it gloss over the horrors of the past, including those committed by neighbors against their Jewish neighbors, for only their frank exposition can ensure that they will not be ever repeated. The spontaneous outburst of interest in, and sympathy for, things Jewish in the Polish democratic opposition movement, and the staunch condemnation of anti-Semitism by most of Polish society in the years that followed the fall of Communism, clearly indicate that what the Museum stands for is not sorne foreign import, but a reflection ofvalues deeply engrained in the coIlective soul ofmodem Poland. And the love shown for their country by Jewish militants and political prisoners in the times of the underground movement, as well as by many among the Polish Jewish diaspora who supported it and now support the Museum -shows that these values are reciprocated. The Museum can, and will, be a place in which the two strands ofPolish history, the Polish and the Jewish one, brutally separated by a horrible past, can intertwine once again -to help build a future of hopeo
